Constitutional Conflict and Political Polarization

Following the broader historical context I tried to supply in the first entry, I will now outline the political conflict that has developed since Evo´s election. As I mentioned, the two major platform points of Evo´s agenda were nationalization of the hydrocarbon (oil and gas) industry and a re-writing of the Bolivian Constitution. While the economic impact of the nationalization program is certainly important, it has been the proposed constitutional reform that has led Bolivian politics to where they are now.

A new constitutional assembly, the goal of social movements for more than a decade, was called and elected in summer 2006, with 54% going to members of Morales´ party MAS (Movimiento a Socialismo). The first conflict in the assembly had to do with voting rules, with MAS pushing for requiring a simple majority to pass individual resolutions and a 2/3 majority to approve the final draft. PODEMOS, the opposition coalition, argued for a 2/3 majority on every vote, regardless of importance, which would give their minority position greater leverage and slow down the proceedings significantly.

The second conflict centered on the arcane debate over Bolivia´s two capitals, with constitutional capital Sucre seeking to have the executive and legislative branches relocated from La Paz, where they have been seated for around a century. The assembly voted not to discuss Sucre´s proposal, touching off protests and violence in the city and accusations of undemocratic proceedings from the opposition. In reality, however, making Sucre the sole capital makes little sense because of the city’s small size (1/4 that of La Paz), the political impracticality of such a move, and the relative unimportance of the debate. In fact, the capital debate seems largely to have been engineered by the opposition as a sensitive and proud symbol around which to rally as much resistance as possible.

The violence in Sucre forced the Assembly to move locations after approving the preliminary draft of the full constitution in November, and the final draft was approved with a 2/3 vote on December 8, 2007. Controversy abounded, however, because the opposition boycotted the final vote amid violent protests, calling it “undemocratic”. The draft constitution is legally legitimate, however, and went to the Bolivian Congress on December 14, 2007 to be put to a nationwide referendum. The referendum, which was originally planned for May 4, 2008, has been postponed by the National Electoral Court because the conditions for the vote do not exist. Meanwhile, the national recall referendum (which I will discuss soon) is scheduled for August 10, meaning that the constitutional referendum must wait until 2009.

The new Constitution represents the basic split between supporters of Morales and his opponents. It would enshrine the program of nationalization that he began with the oil industry, and would institute a program of land redistribution that could potentially cap land holding allowances and divide 1/5 of Bolivia’s land among indigenous families. Most importantly for the historically disenfranchised peasant majority, the Constitution would allocate more political and economic rights to the poor indigenous people of the altiplano (western highlands).

Critics argue that the new constitution concentrates too much power in the central government in La Paz, and that it unfairly favors indigenous Bolivians (who, I might point out, have suffered centuries of systematic oppression at the hands of Bolivia’s European descendents). Right-wing opposition has raised fears of a MAS-led authoritarian government backed by Venezuela, although the reforms written into the new Constitution are the result of decades of social movements and political unrest rather than merely the political agenda of a single party. Even Morales´ supporters recognize that he is only the current face of a long struggle; “With or without MAS, with or without Evo, we will continue.”

With increased academic interest has come the recognition that the modern Bolivian state is structured in a way that reinforces inequality. The current Constitution and modern Bolivian society are both built on the European model, with no consideration for existing conditions in Bolivia or appreciation for the inherent differences between post-enlightenment Europe and this largely agrarian South American nation. The legacy of colonialism has further strengthened strict social and economic divisions along the geographical and ethnic boundaries between the landed elite of European descent and the highland campesinos. There is inherent in Bolivian society a strong undercurrent of racism, clear enough that I have noticed it even in my short time here. Equally clear is how race becomes a manipulative political tool for sowing enmity between regions and ethnicities. I will offer some of my personal reflections on this in a later entry.

The proposed Constitution, and the political conflict surrounding it, is so important because it represents the concrete, radical change that could not be realized through the democracies of the 80s, the economic liberalization of the 90s, or the democratic rhetoric of today’s regional leaders. This last group, those representing a push for autonomy in the resource-rich eastern lowland departamentos, have further complicated the political situation. The autonomy movements, begun by Santa Cruz and taken up by Beni, Pando, and Tarija (which collectively form the geographical area known as the media luna), have dominated the news since I have arrived. Autonomy and referendum; these are the phrases that define the politics of the day, and they will need another entry to themselves before I have done justice to the background of the situation I am currently studying.