The Revocatorio Vote, and Prospects for Change

Finally, the Vote

Bolivia’s first-ever national recall referendum took place Sunday, and it was not quite the revolutionary event that two months of constitutional controversy, accusations of illegality, political shuffling, international concerns, regional violence, protests, hunger strikes, and coup fears indicated it would be. Tensions remained high through the weekend, but there were no more incidents of major violence.

However, in the days before the vote, President Evo Morales was prevented from visiting 5 different cities by politician-organized mobilizations to take over the airports where he was to land. Opposition sectors in the media luna departments are so hostile to the President’s policies that he effectively could not travel in half of the entire country where he is president. Evo and his ministers denounced what they called “civic dictatorships,” run by rightist youth groups and conservative civic committees, which are carrying on the legacy of the military dictators of the 60s and 70s.

The day of the vote was a relatively calm one in Bolivia. There were some attempts by right-wing student groups in Santa Cruz to intimidate voters, but the police took their weapons without any major incidents. Here in La Paz, the city was quieter than I could have imagined. “Parece al campo,” one man said. With only official vehicles allowed to operate, with alcohol, weapons, and demonstrations prohibited, and with virtually all businesses closed, the normally bustling city did seem like the countryside.

Polling places were located in neighborhood schools, and all of the sites that I visited were relaxed and tranquil, with police posted outside and kids playing inside while their parents voted. The day seemed more like a holiday than the date of a hotly contested election. The government followed through on its promise of tranquility and security, and the Bolivian voters apparently acknowledged Evo´s request for the vote to be a “fiesta democratica.” Of Bolivia’s 4.1 million person electorate (out of a very young population of 10 million), more than 80% of eligible citizens turned out to vote.


Winners and Losers

As nearly every story has reported it, the vote results made everyone winners and everyone losers. Margins of victory or defeat were large enough that the contested interpretation of percentage results is unlikely to even be an issue, despite the controversy of the past weeks. Predictions of winners and losers were basically accurate.

Three prefects were revoked; the opposition governor of La Paz department, the MAS governor of Evo stronghold Oruro, and governor Manfred Reyes Villa of Cochabamba. Reyes Villa, who has been perhaps Evo´s greatest political enemy, originally proposed a recall back in November 2007. Nonetheless, when the Congress finally approved the President’s version, he called it unconstitutional and refused to participate. The Cochabamba prefect was overwhelmingly voted out of office, but says he will continue his job. It remains to be seen if and how the government will remove the stubborn Reyes Villa, and what conflict this attempt might ignite.

The reason everyone who is a winner is also a loser is that all the important political players in Bolivia were confirmed. Every media luna prefect was ratified with well over 50% of the vote, with Santa Cruz’s Ruben Costas receiving over 70%. Each media luna governor won a much higher percentage in the revocatorio than in their original election bids, and in general support was higher for the autonomy advocates on August 10 than it was for the autonomy votes of the past 3 months. So, it seems that each opposition prefect has had his individual position strengthened, while the media luna as a whole will view the results as a mandate for pushing forward their autonomy initiatives. This result, the opposite of what Evo and MAS had hoped for, makes the President’s own victory bittersweet.

Evo did win, and big. Exact counts are not in, but Evo´s margin of victory is reported to be around 65%. This is at least 10 percentage points higher than his original victory margin of 54%, which was an unprecedented electoral mandate two and a half years ago. Two factors make the President’s August 10 percentage particularly impressive. The first is that, while Evo predictably received the majority of his support in the mostly poor and indigenous western highlands, he had solid “Yes” majorities in most departments and had respectable support even in the media luna. Secondly, this 65% (or whatever it ends up being) is essentially a concrete approval rating that amounts to around a TWO THIRDS nation-wide majority in favor of the President’s policies and agenda. In such a divided country, this level of support is astronomical.


Can Bolivia Move Forward

Now, the questions facing Bolivia is: with both sides thoroughly strengthened after a bitter campaign season, what can possibly change? Neither the President nor the prefects were able to weaken their opponent, as each had hoped. Instead, they have consolidated their bases of support around the very issues that have driven Bolivia’s political and regional polarization. In his victory speech, Santa Cruz’s Costas chanted for Autonomy and declared “Out with foreign monkeys!”, referring to Evo, whom he also called a dictator. The mayor of Santa Cruz declared that the President had not learned how to govern, and “asked” the Armed Forces to overthrow him. Other victorious prefects were less inflammatory in their victory celebrations, but still hammered away against the central government in their pro-autonomy speeches.

I attended Evo´s victory rally in the Plaza Murillo, where flag and banner-waving crowds chanted their support for the President and listened to him speak from the Presidential Palace balcony. He highlighted the democratic achievement of the vote, which was unexpectedly successful for a Bolivian political process. He thanked all the voters, and stated his respect for his victorious opponents. He spoke strongly of the ratification of his government’s process of change, and especially the need to continue with the nationalization of natural resources. Perhaps most importantly, he spoke of the need to initiate a political dialogue, with the end result of instituting the new political constitution (C.P.E) in the near future, to the benefit of all Bolivians.

The President has reiterated his call for dialogue, which I interpret to mean a gradual process of compromise. He stated his intention to integrate the media luna autonomy statutes, which the government has rejected as illegal, into the new national constitution. While this sounds and seems like what needs to happen, this goal may not be realistic. While Evo emphasized that his first priority is ending extreme poverty in the country (an ideal which no-one can oppose), he made clear that the means for doing this were founded on the recovery of Bolivia’s natural resources. This puts him directly at odds with the eastern prefects, who have made clear that they oppose state control of resource revenues, even if they are being used to fund programs to alleviate poverty.

As I have outlined before, each side has at their back an argument for why the other side should compromise. Because the revocatorio failed to break the stalemate, dialogue may be inevitable. The media luna departments cannot follow through on their autonomy statues without government concession of some type, while Evo cannot effectively execute his land reform and resource nationalization programs without regional cooperation at some level. To achieve a progressive compromise, both sides would have to be efficient and reasonable in their negotiations. As I have noted again and again, however, Bolivian politics are not conducive to tolerance or compromise. Opposition leaders rally support around the issues of most symbolic importance to their voters, unafraid to manipulate racist prejudice and economic-self interest for political gain, while the government’s supporters are seeking policies that they view as essential for themselves and for Bolivia’s future. There is no aspect of either side’s platform that is not considered or represented as “essential.”

It may be more likely that another referendum follows a lack of dialogue. Next year could see, as some ministers have suggested, a national referendum on the controversial issues in the new constitution: regional autonomies, land reform, re-election. This type of referendum would surely polarize Bolivian politics even further, centered as it is on the issues that have been most divisive. If a new attempt at dialogue and compromise fails, however, we should expect Bolivia’s leaders to return to what they know: secessionist hardball of the most polarizing type, conducted without concern for country’s long-term welfare, and populist outcries against subversive neoliberals.

As always, predictions in Bolivia have little value. We will have to wait and see whether politics here are entering a new phase, or whether the cycle of social and political polarization is as self-perpetuating as my research has indicated. I hope that my diligent blog readers will now consider themselves knowledgeable on the subject of Bolivian politics, the people and events that drive developments, the strategies and issues that mobilize support, the factors and circumstances that facilitate polarization, and the political, cultural, and geographical diversity of this country. I know that I have learned more than I could have imagined.

This post concludes my study of political developments and patterns here, though I will offer a summarizing account of personal experiences, impressions, and reflections on my time in Bolivia.