Lessons Learned in La Paz

After two entries dealing with my personal experiences with and descriptions of things here in La Paz, it is time for an update on my study of politics. The theme of this post is polarization: in education, in the press, in geography, in politics, and in society. Things are never as simple as I think at first, and every issue and position is layered. As I noted earlier, the issues that have dominated current politics are constitutional reform, autonomy, and the recall referendum. These themes continue to drive political developments here, and now I will elaborate on some of what I have learned in my two weeks here. This is a LONG one, but it covers a lot and will be the only one for a while, so feel free to take it a section at a time, or all in one gulp if you think yourself up to the intellectual challenge.

1. Societal Polarization
2. Evo and the Economy
3. Cycles of Political Antagonism
4. Perception of “Autonomy”
5. Recall Referendum and Prospects for Change


1. Social Polarization

“Bolivia is a young democracy,” it has been explained to me again and again. Perhaps the single root cause of the current political crisis is that Bolivia is dealing with the formative stages of democratic politics, state structure, national economics, and social welfare all at once. Democracy, neoliberalism, social reform, and nationalism were all introduced to Bolivian politics within a decade, and in a country that has no democratic precedents to look back upon, every event is a potential turning point in history. Politics here are not a legacy, nor are they a refined game, as in the U.S. and Europe. Politics here are raw and essential, because political outcomes directly impact the immediate future of individuals, regions, and groups within the country. These are the politics of formation, and very different political visions competing for Bolivia’s future have pushed polarization into all aspects of society.

A paceño friend of mine was giving me the rundown of higher education here in La Paz, in response to my question about the differences between the public and private universities. The public university, located right downtown and featuring a mural of Ché on the wall, is full of izquierdistas. He informed me that public school students are all socialist, communist, or at least anti-imperialist. The more expensive catholic school attended by my friend, by contrast, is located in the affluent suburb of Zona Sur, and is full of derechista students who are all pro-capitalism, pro-free markets, and pro-America. Schools, it seems, are the first place where Bolivians are divided along strict social and economic lines and indoctrinated with an economic and political ideology. This generalization neglects minorities in both camps, of course, but does help to explain how the society-wide divisions that trouble Bolivia today are founded.

The press is the next great example of this societal-political polarization. During an interview with a former journalist and vice-presidential candidate, the media’s role in Bolivia’s crisis became even more clear than it had been just from watching television and perusing the newsstands. She explained to me her theory for media-politics dynamics in Bolivia, where control of the mediums of information was the first battle between the government and the opposition. In a feedback cycle of sorts, competing forces attempt to influence press coverage of politics, resulting in mediums that cater to political viewpoints, which reinforce those viewpoints to the readers who already hold them. The media, divided between pro-government public outlets and opposition-supporting private companies, has worsened the political polarization within Bolivia.

This pattern, as I acknowledged during the interview, is consistent with the psychological phenomenon known as the polarization effect, which explains how people choose to expose themselves to other people and ideas that are consistent with already-held beliefs. The development of “militant journalism,” as my interviewee called it, has severely damaged the credibility of information presented by news mediums. 10 years ago, a study found the public faith in televised information to be unwavering, placing the credibility of the news mediums close to that of the Catholic Church, Armed Forces, and National Police. A recent study, she informed me, found public acceptance of televised information at less than 50%, placing journalism in 11th place in the Bolivian’s list of credible information sources.

This lack of available objective information further hampers political and social progress by encouraging citizens to fill the resulting gaps in information with ideology. Without complete or consistent information, however, political opinions tend to take the simplest forms possible, rendering complex and layered issues into black-and-white, us-vs.-them conflicts. While most of the politically knowledgeable Bolivians I have spoken to agree that sensationalism and concentrated control make the press a polarizing agent in political culture, another journalist I spoke to argued that Bolivians are capable of analyzing information and making deductive judgements. As in every other area of Bolivian reality, however, the truth is that is depends on the region. Big cities and economic centers are bastions of political culture, and so citizens of La Paz and Santa Cruz are saturated in news and information. Rural Bolivians, however, often are exposed only to the most basic news and political information, and are much more likely to make political judgements and decisions in community blocks, as advised by social and communal leaders.

All my interviewees, including those who have run campaigns or written columns against Evo, admit that his level of support deserves respect and democratic legitimacy. While acknowledging his majority victory in the elections, and continuing strong base of support, they also argue that much of Evo´s support comes from disadvantaged social groups who are susceptible to social pressures. As one put it, “most of Evo´s support comes from La Paz-el Alto and rural areas, and he represents the leftist current.” While it is true that most of Evo´s support is from poor and indigenous groups, and many of Evo´s policies are considered socialist, it is hardly true that his support comes from leftists. The truth is, Evo´s supporters are largely groups that have no political experience and have never been represented. The poor majority in Bolivia is not interested in adhering to a socialist ideology; they are supporting a government that they see making changes for their benefit.


2. Evo and the Economy

By far, most of the criticism of Evo I have heard has been concerning his economic record. Economic columnists and NGO spokespeople alike have spoken of poor administration, resource mismanagement, and politically-motivated economic decisions. Issue number one in economics is the nationalization of the hydrocarbon (and maybe soon the mining) industry. It was explained to me that it is not technically “nationalization”, because foreign companies are allowed to invest as long as the government maintains 51% control. Nonetheless, his policies are criticized for dampening foreign investment, slowing the economy, and not taking advantage of the international markets available to Bolivia’s copious resource wealth.

Nationalization was a central platform point of Evo´s election campaign, and I have been told that it was politically motivated and not well thought-out economically. Bolivia recently admitted it could provide only ¼ of the natural gas that it had promised daily in a contract with Argentina. The economic ministers have been criticized as political appointees who lack the technocratic expertise to manage a nationalized energy industry. Evo´s governing style consists more of rural tours and public discussions than of expert-advised policy-making, and has led some to disillusionment. A young man I spoke with said that he had supported Evo´s election with high hopes and expectations, but he has been disappointed by administrative mistakes and lack of political results.

Many Bolivians, however, do see progress from Evo´s policies. In the midst of his referendum campaign, advertisements for the various ministries are highlighting progress and accomplishments in areas from health and education to transportation and energy infrastructure. “Change moves slowly, it doesn’t happen overnight.” This is the attitude of optimistic supporters, who point out that Evo has had only 2 ½ years of heavily opposed rule to make his reforms. An 81-year old sitting in a park declared that I should come back after Evo had been in office for 10 years, and I would see all the changes that he had promised and that his supporters had hoped for.

Whatever side of the political fence, Bolivians agree that they cannot just sit and wait for positive economic change. What the Bolivian economy needs is work and money for its citizens; the disagreement is over how to get it. Free market advocates I have talked to have pointed to the decrease in foreign investment and extraction and argued that open markets are the quickest way to lift Bolivians out of poverty. Evo and his supporters, some of whom recently forced out American development agency USAID, look back on decades of multinational exploitation that did little to improve Bolivian lives. They call on national pride, regional exchange, and state investment to put people to work and keep the money from Bolivia’s resource wealth in the hands of Bolivians. The most workable solution is certainly a compromise, where Bolivia is committed to social progress but still manages to “take advantage of the best aspects of globalization and capitalism.”


3. Cycles of Political Antagonism

Evo is often described in the international news as “Bolivia´s controversial indigenous/socialist/reformist president.” Here in Bolivia, he is controversial on several levels. As I have written, his rejection of neo-liberal precedents and his mixed-socialist economic policies are controversial. Evo´s aggressive political rhetoric and often-divisive positions do little to mitigate political antagonism. In fact, Evo´s language often seems specifically intended to ostracize and demonize his political opponents. The lack of political subtlety in the Presidents statements may reflect his true feelings and the sentiments of his base of support, but have done him more harm than good in the eyes of many politically neutral Bolivians.

Young acquaintances of mine, while they may support some of Evo´s causes, are frustrated by his polarizing nature. “He is the President, he is supposed to represent all Bolivians, but he is not.” One friend compared Evo´s preferential demeanor towards the lower classes as the reverse of previous president “Goni” Sanchez de Lozada´s favor for the upper and middle classes. This criticism, while understandable, does not get much sympathy from me. After all, Evo´s declared mission is to right the wrongs done to the lower classes throughout Bolivia´s history, and the wealthier Bolivians are certainly not in need of reform and social attention in any way like Bolivia´s poor are. Still, when Evo calls every move against him an “imperialist,” “neoliberal” or “secessionist” plot, he deepens Bolivia´s political divides and tarnishes his own credibility.

As I have outlined earlier, the controversy surrounding the constituent assembly and their approval of the new constitution laid the seeds for much of the political antagonism occurring today. One right-of-center interviewee of mine described the government´s action as the “decapitation of constitutionality,” destroying the constitutional legitimacy of that and all future action. Even those in favor of the constitutional reforms will say that the ends may justify the less-than-egalitarian means, but that the episode has contributed greatly to the current crisis. The pro-autonomy department heads, perceiving the constitutional assembly as technically democratic but of debatable legality, took the lesson to heart.

The autonomy votes were the political counterpunch to the controversial constitutional assembly. While certainly illegal under the constitution, the prefects called upon the trump card of democracy, the popular vote. Arguing that their process is no less democratic and no more illegal than the constituent assembly’s vote, the autonomy advocates are further marginalizing constitutional legitimacy. The “magic vote of the citizenship” is today´s token legitimacy, where constitutionality is a luxury and democracy is a relative term that can mean very different things depending on who it benefits.


4. Perception of Autonomy

I expect for opinions on autonomy to get even more interesting in the coming weeks I will spend in Sucre and Santa Cruz. Even thus far, in La Paz, the question of autonomy inspires a diverse array of reactions and understandings. The definition of the word can be interpreted widely. For some, autonomy sounds strikingly similar to secession or independence, and this is how many poor Bolivians have understood it. One old man rambled about foreign infiltration in Santa Cruz after WWII, the gathering of arms in the region, autocratic control of the region`s economy and politics, and the threat of civil war. Each of his opinions about Santa Cruz could be traced back to a news story or to actual circumstances, but his views are a perfect example about how the complex and dynamic nature of Bolivian politics get oversimplified and salted with hostile ideological predispositions.

Santa Cruz often gets vilified by the media, the government, and by public opinion here in the altiplano, as the bastion of privileged elites and selfish citizens. Santa Cruz`s autonomy statutes are the most radical, but a pro-autonomy politician explained to me that the more extreme demands do not necessarily reflect the goals of the department´s people. Many of the demands are made to seem extreme on purpose, to give the prefects leverage in anticipated future negotiations with the government over the reforms represented by the new constitution. This version of autonomy is said to be made “a la mala”, as a negative reaction to the new constitution, justified on the grounds that even an illegal vote is democratic.

Another problem with the autonomy statutes is that they are so visibly and vocally represented by the prefects. Even those who argue that the regional majorities favor autonomy have admitted to me that they view the prefects as representing their own personal interests and those of the economic elite. As they say, the sentiment for autonomy exists in the population, but the politicians are using this democratic cover to protect their own interests as well. While supporters of autonomy look upon this elite representation as a necessary evil, those who oppose (including Evo, the central government, and most Paceños) see it as an unforgivable evil in the autonomy movements.

Most people here in La Paz, in accord with the views of Evo and his ministers, see the autonomy votes as manipulation of many by a selfish and powerful few. As I noted before, the results in favor of autonomy are far from overwhelming in the 4 departamentos that have voted. While this perception of secessionist leadership is pervasive, many also view the people of Santa Cruz as anti-Bolivian (and those of Sucre as racist, remember the graffiti?). When asked how they thought people in different regions self-identify, many have said that Cruceños (Santa Cruz residents) think of themselves as seperate from the rest of Bolivia, and identify first as Cruceños and second as Bolivianos. When asked whether this puts at risk the national democracy, the answer is almost always “yes”.

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the autonomy issue is that noone can agree on what exactly it means. The prefects want more control of regional resources, and a different distribution percentage for tax revenues. The people of the autonomy regions, however, have more immediate and basic motives. Bolivia is a big country, and telecomunications and transportation leave much to be desired in connecting its different regions. La Paz, being the administrative capital, is the seat of all official business, and all federal regulations and certifications must go through the western capital. Frustration has built in eastern regions, where doctors or professors or anyone needing federal certification or approval must go all the way to La Paz.

The autonomy sought by the departamentos could better be described as de-centralization. People in regions distant from La Paz feel neglected and inconvenienced by the central government, and want the bulk of administration brought closer to home and run through municipal and regional governments. This request is not anti-reform: even non-Evo supporters would agree that Bolivia needs a comprehensive and cooperative plan for reform, a “national pact” as I have heard it called. The difficulty lies in the cooperation and mutual understanding necessary to accomplish decentralization and national reform at the same time. As I have seen, those in favor of each process have taken steps toward their end in the most antagonizing manner possible, and the two goals now are so polarized and their advocates so estranged that Bolivia seems to be on what one editorial called “El Camino a la Violencia”, the “road to violence.”


5. Recall Referendum and Prospects for Change

As I originally wrote, the national recall referendum of August 10 will serve as the climax and culmination of my studies here. As I also mentioned, I expected the situation and circumstances of the referendum to change a great deal between the time of my arrival and the vote. I have not been disappointed.

The referendum was originally proposed by Evo and rejected by the opposition, but after the success of the autonomy votes the opposition coalition PODEMOS and the oficialista MAS voted the referendum into law with a bipartisan majority. The recall is constitutionally legitimate, because it was passed as a law by Congress and is organized and administered by the as-yet untarnished National Electoral Court. However, it is without precedent, and the motives for the vote and the potential results have further polarized government supporters and opposition.

A central disagreement is over the percentage necessary to remove an elected official from office. The original law requires a “no” vote greater than the percentage that elected the official to office. This would mean that 54% would have to vote “no” to remove Evo from office, because of the 54% majority he won in the 2005 elections. For the regional governors, who are also subject to the referendum law, the percentages are much lower. Many prefects were elected with between 30-45% support, meaning that a minority “no” vote in the recall equivalent to their previous victory percentage in general elections could remove them from office. This is part of Evo´s strategy: if opposing prefects are removed from office, either new elections will be held or Evo himself will appoint the governors in the traditional constitutional method. The opposition party in Congress is working to change the recall law to require and even 51% “no” vote to remove an official from office, regardless of their incoming election percentages. This change would clearly help the opposition prefects and hurt Evo, so resistance in Congress is not surprising. The future of this effort is unclear, and is one of the big questions that remain concerning the upcoming referendum.

Also uncertain is whether all the departmental prefects will participate in the revocatorio or not. The law applies the recall to every governor as well as the president and vice-president, but the coalition of opposition prefects declared 2 weeks ago that they would not participate. In a recent change, however, 2 opposition prefects, including autonomy leader Costas of Santa Cruz, have agreed to submit to the recall referendum without pre-conditions. Another prefect has said he will participate only if the voting rules are changed to the 51% majority requirement. It remains true that much is likely to change before the date of the vote, in just over a month.

Voter registration for the August recall is the highest ever recorded in Bolivia, even surpassing the record-breaking elections of 2005 and 2006. Participation among those able to vote is expected to reach 80% in some areas, with La Paz-el Alto and the surrounding area drawing the highest proportion of residents to the polls. This level of voter participation, when considered alongside the amount of political demonstration that takes place in Bolivia, is perhaps the most startling difference between democracy here and in the U.S. Democracy here is not an assumption, nor does it inspire complacency or apathy. The gritty and passionate politics of Bolivia reflect the genuine and immediate interest of the people in their own futures and that of their country. There is a real need for change here, recognizable everywhere, and people respond with strong opinions and political action. If the citizens of a country like the United States could find that same urgent conviction, things could get very exciting very fast. On a side note, an old man informed me that Bolivians all support the American candidate who is the first moreno (black man) to be nominated for President.

For now, however, Bolivians face the prospect of continuing struggles. Most educated opinions I have heard guessed that there will be 2 years more of political stalemate, barring an unlikely governmental collapse or the disintegration of the opposition. Some advocate a new constituent assembly, to write a constitution that will incorporate the regional autonomy statutes within a de-centralized. Others think that Evo will be able to force through his reforms and constitution, and that the rebellious prefects will cave to the central government. But all agree that the current crisis is as much the result of personal interests and stubborn attitudes than of irreconcilable differences. Hope has been expressed that the two sides can sit down at the table to work out their differences, but the heightened political tension makes sincere dialogue unlikely from either side. As one interviewee put it, “all Bolivians want to better their lives, they want to move forward, they want more equality and social justice. The people want progress, and they are frustrated by the political blockage.”

Much is likely to change before the revocatorio, and despite generally low expectations, the vote may shift the political balance in Bolivia one way or the other. As each news headline makes me re-think what I know about Bolivia, I am reminded of the saying: “en Bolivia, todo es posible, nada es seguro”. Everything is possible, nothing is certain. Speaking of politics, one NGO worker concluded his interview by saying “aprendas que en Bolivia, puede pasar loe que no has imaginado.” You learn that in Bolivia, things can happen that you haven’t even imagined.

Thus, my project continues to reflect the dynamic and uncertain course of Bolivian politics. I leave behind my 2 weeks in La Paz, and head now to Sucre for almost a week. From Sucre, I travel to Santa Cruz. Each of these cities will certainly provide new insights and developments, and I will return to my blog when I am able. Happy late 4th of July, and que todo vaya bien.