The Revocatorio Vote, and Prospects for Change

Finally, the Vote

Bolivia’s first-ever national recall referendum took place Sunday, and it was not quite the revolutionary event that two months of constitutional controversy, accusations of illegality, political shuffling, international concerns, regional violence, protests, hunger strikes, and coup fears indicated it would be. Tensions remained high through the weekend, but there were no more incidents of major violence.

However, in the days before the vote, President Evo Morales was prevented from visiting 5 different cities by politician-organized mobilizations to take over the airports where he was to land. Opposition sectors in the media luna departments are so hostile to the President’s policies that he effectively could not travel in half of the entire country where he is president. Evo and his ministers denounced what they called “civic dictatorships,” run by rightist youth groups and conservative civic committees, which are carrying on the legacy of the military dictators of the 60s and 70s.

The day of the vote was a relatively calm one in Bolivia. There were some attempts by right-wing student groups in Santa Cruz to intimidate voters, but the police took their weapons without any major incidents. Here in La Paz, the city was quieter than I could have imagined. “Parece al campo,” one man said. With only official vehicles allowed to operate, with alcohol, weapons, and demonstrations prohibited, and with virtually all businesses closed, the normally bustling city did seem like the countryside.

Polling places were located in neighborhood schools, and all of the sites that I visited were relaxed and tranquil, with police posted outside and kids playing inside while their parents voted. The day seemed more like a holiday than the date of a hotly contested election. The government followed through on its promise of tranquility and security, and the Bolivian voters apparently acknowledged Evo´s request for the vote to be a “fiesta democratica.” Of Bolivia’s 4.1 million person electorate (out of a very young population of 10 million), more than 80% of eligible citizens turned out to vote.


Winners and Losers

As nearly every story has reported it, the vote results made everyone winners and everyone losers. Margins of victory or defeat were large enough that the contested interpretation of percentage results is unlikely to even be an issue, despite the controversy of the past weeks. Predictions of winners and losers were basically accurate.

Three prefects were revoked; the opposition governor of La Paz department, the MAS governor of Evo stronghold Oruro, and governor Manfred Reyes Villa of Cochabamba. Reyes Villa, who has been perhaps Evo´s greatest political enemy, originally proposed a recall back in November 2007. Nonetheless, when the Congress finally approved the President’s version, he called it unconstitutional and refused to participate. The Cochabamba prefect was overwhelmingly voted out of office, but says he will continue his job. It remains to be seen if and how the government will remove the stubborn Reyes Villa, and what conflict this attempt might ignite.

The reason everyone who is a winner is also a loser is that all the important political players in Bolivia were confirmed. Every media luna prefect was ratified with well over 50% of the vote, with Santa Cruz’s Ruben Costas receiving over 70%. Each media luna governor won a much higher percentage in the revocatorio than in their original election bids, and in general support was higher for the autonomy advocates on August 10 than it was for the autonomy votes of the past 3 months. So, it seems that each opposition prefect has had his individual position strengthened, while the media luna as a whole will view the results as a mandate for pushing forward their autonomy initiatives. This result, the opposite of what Evo and MAS had hoped for, makes the President’s own victory bittersweet.

Evo did win, and big. Exact counts are not in, but Evo´s margin of victory is reported to be around 65%. This is at least 10 percentage points higher than his original victory margin of 54%, which was an unprecedented electoral mandate two and a half years ago. Two factors make the President’s August 10 percentage particularly impressive. The first is that, while Evo predictably received the majority of his support in the mostly poor and indigenous western highlands, he had solid “Yes” majorities in most departments and had respectable support even in the media luna. Secondly, this 65% (or whatever it ends up being) is essentially a concrete approval rating that amounts to around a TWO THIRDS nation-wide majority in favor of the President’s policies and agenda. In such a divided country, this level of support is astronomical.


Can Bolivia Move Forward

Now, the questions facing Bolivia is: with both sides thoroughly strengthened after a bitter campaign season, what can possibly change? Neither the President nor the prefects were able to weaken their opponent, as each had hoped. Instead, they have consolidated their bases of support around the very issues that have driven Bolivia’s political and regional polarization. In his victory speech, Santa Cruz’s Costas chanted for Autonomy and declared “Out with foreign monkeys!”, referring to Evo, whom he also called a dictator. The mayor of Santa Cruz declared that the President had not learned how to govern, and “asked” the Armed Forces to overthrow him. Other victorious prefects were less inflammatory in their victory celebrations, but still hammered away against the central government in their pro-autonomy speeches.

I attended Evo´s victory rally in the Plaza Murillo, where flag and banner-waving crowds chanted their support for the President and listened to him speak from the Presidential Palace balcony. He highlighted the democratic achievement of the vote, which was unexpectedly successful for a Bolivian political process. He thanked all the voters, and stated his respect for his victorious opponents. He spoke strongly of the ratification of his government’s process of change, and especially the need to continue with the nationalization of natural resources. Perhaps most importantly, he spoke of the need to initiate a political dialogue, with the end result of instituting the new political constitution (C.P.E) in the near future, to the benefit of all Bolivians.

The President has reiterated his call for dialogue, which I interpret to mean a gradual process of compromise. He stated his intention to integrate the media luna autonomy statutes, which the government has rejected as illegal, into the new national constitution. While this sounds and seems like what needs to happen, this goal may not be realistic. While Evo emphasized that his first priority is ending extreme poverty in the country (an ideal which no-one can oppose), he made clear that the means for doing this were founded on the recovery of Bolivia’s natural resources. This puts him directly at odds with the eastern prefects, who have made clear that they oppose state control of resource revenues, even if they are being used to fund programs to alleviate poverty.

As I have outlined before, each side has at their back an argument for why the other side should compromise. Because the revocatorio failed to break the stalemate, dialogue may be inevitable. The media luna departments cannot follow through on their autonomy statues without government concession of some type, while Evo cannot effectively execute his land reform and resource nationalization programs without regional cooperation at some level. To achieve a progressive compromise, both sides would have to be efficient and reasonable in their negotiations. As I have noted again and again, however, Bolivian politics are not conducive to tolerance or compromise. Opposition leaders rally support around the issues of most symbolic importance to their voters, unafraid to manipulate racist prejudice and economic-self interest for political gain, while the government’s supporters are seeking policies that they view as essential for themselves and for Bolivia’s future. There is no aspect of either side’s platform that is not considered or represented as “essential.”

It may be more likely that another referendum follows a lack of dialogue. Next year could see, as some ministers have suggested, a national referendum on the controversial issues in the new constitution: regional autonomies, land reform, re-election. This type of referendum would surely polarize Bolivian politics even further, centered as it is on the issues that have been most divisive. If a new attempt at dialogue and compromise fails, however, we should expect Bolivia’s leaders to return to what they know: secessionist hardball of the most polarizing type, conducted without concern for country’s long-term welfare, and populist outcries against subversive neoliberals.

As always, predictions in Bolivia have little value. We will have to wait and see whether politics here are entering a new phase, or whether the cycle of social and political polarization is as self-perpetuating as my research has indicated. I hope that my diligent blog readers will now consider themselves knowledgeable on the subject of Bolivian politics, the people and events that drive developments, the strategies and issues that mobilize support, the factors and circumstances that facilitate polarization, and the political, cultural, and geographical diversity of this country. I know that I have learned more than I could have imagined.

This post concludes my study of political developments and patterns here, though I will offer a summarizing account of personal experiences, impressions, and reflections on my time in Bolivia.

History, the Revocatorio, and a political climax in Bolivia

Living in the Historical Present

I am back in La Paz for my final week, after several weeks of being in and out of Bolivia. After Paraguay, I spent a week in Peru being a tourist. The city of Cuzco is beautiful, if crowded with tourists, and evokes colonial Spain as well as the lost majesty of the Incan empire centered there. In visits to the Sacred Valley of the Incas, and to the awe-inspiring ruins of Macchu Picchu, it was impossible not to feel wonder and respect for the ancient cultures that flourished all over South America, as well as regret that they were so completely obliterated by the Spanish conquest and colonialization that transformed the course of history on this continent.

Again and again, I have felt a strong sense that the political atmosphere and developments of contemporary Latin America, and Bolivia in particular, represent the culmination of an era of history that has seen cycles of oppressive, exploitative, and violent governments and societies that operated without any consideration for the people who called this place home for millennia before Europe imposed its religious, economic, and social structures on this hemisphere. The past decades, and especially the past few years, have revealed that this cycle has taken on a new character, a potential break with these long-established social norms.

History here is not something to be studied as a subject. It remains unresolved, and its processes and legacies are defining the conflicted and dynamic present in Bolivia as well as elsewhere in South America. In Peru, which has a similar ethnic composition to Bolivia, the richness of the pre-Colombian cultures has been celebrated as a point of national pride for much longer than in Bolivia (thanks in no small part to the tourism industry). Only recently, here, have social movements representing indigenous cultural pride taken on a political role and demanded to be part of the national identity.

Evo Morales remains the symbol of this transformation, and his political party MAS claims to be the political instrument of the social, worker, and indigenous movements. The “cultural revolution” that accompanies their “democratic revolution” really is changing the social and political landscape of Bolivia. It is these very tangible and visible changes, which are re-defining the nature of politics and society, which have brought such fierce resistance in the form of the capital plena and autonomy movements. As a editorial I read today put it, everyone was willing to accept an Indian president as a sign of progress in the country, as long as he didn’t change anything. Well, he is changing things; the entire system of institutions and processes that govern the country, in fact.

Revocatorio Shuffle

As expected, the lead-up to the Revocatorio has not proceeded simply. Increasingly sharp polarization has characterized the political atmosphere of the past weeks in Bolivia. In an attempt to reach a compromise that would allow the vote to proceed with minimal controversy, the National Electoral Court (CNE) proposed a change to the voting rules. Constitutionally, only the Congress can legislate a change to the law that instituted the recall referendum. However, the CNE, joined by 7 of the 9 departmental courts, made a somewhat iffy claim for legality by saying that it was only clarifying the technicalities of vote interpretation, rather than altering the text of the law.

The court declared that a 50% +1 majority would be necessary to remove the departmental prefects from office, contrary to the original scheme, which required only a “No” percentage greater than their original election mandate. The decision, interpreted by many as a cave-in to the opposition-laden departmental courts, is sympathetic to criticisms that the original percentage rules favored President Morales and Vice President Garcia Linares, who still require a “No” vote greater than their 54% electoral mandate to be removed.

It remains uncertain whether the CNE´s decision will be implemented, but the government has hinted it might accept the new interpretation rules. The constitutional ambiguity and lack of legal clarity is certain to make the vote, and the interpretation of the results, tumultuous at best.

Meanwhile, the lone judge on the Constitutional Tribunal issued another call for suspending the vote until its constitutionality can be determined. This was in response to a claim submitted by the Cochabamba Prefect, Manfred Reyes Villa, who has remained the most vocal critic of the referendum and still refuses to participate. This, following the judge´s first declaration, is the latest of what Evo´s Vice President has called “an anti-democratic soap opera,” orchestrated by the opposition and the oligarchic media.

This “telenovela antidemocratica” began with criticisms of the law establishing the vote (which was approved by a bipartisan majority) and continued with questions about the National Electoral Court´s capabilities. The discovery of ID voter card fraud became a spectacle in the press, where headlines questioning the legitimacy of newly registered voters dominated newspapers for more than a week. The voter fraud, drastically overstated by the reports, is unlikely to have any impact whatsoever on the vote results, but the sensationalized headlines give a different impression.

In fact, newspaper headlines are one of the single greatest sources of misinformation and over-generalization, because most people here just glance at the front page of the papers sitting on the newsstands, and interpret the news accordingly. From my observation of newspaper headlines and story patterns, there does seem to be a steady push to put in doubt the institutions, processes, and political players involved in the referendum. Evo, of course, answers all this by saying that his critics are afraid of democracy, and afraid of the Bolivian citizens.

Rising Tensions and Violence

August 6, Bolivia´s Independence Day, provided a stark picture of the national political scene. In the face of opposition-organized protests and security concerns, Evo was forced to cancel the traditional Presidential visit to Sucre to participate in the constitutional ceremony. Instead, the conservative opposition celebrated in Sucre, behind threats of violent demonstration, while Evo spoke during proceedings in La Paz. He highlighted economic progress during his 2 ½ years in office, noting that during his presidency Bolivia has eliminated its fiscal deficit, generated a budget surplus, multiplied export revenues, increased resource redistribution to regions, municipalities, and universities, and established itself as a sovereign nation with dignity and credibility in the international community. All of his points are supported by economic statistics and analysis I have seen.

Bolivians seem not to be wavering in their support of the indigenous president, as the press here has been suggesting for weeks. International polling institutions recently showed Evo´s approval rating at 59%, one of the highest in Latin America. So, it seems that Evo will win, and win well, in the recall vote, but also that his support will regionally limited. Most expect him to get high “No” percentages in the media luna, while receiving an overwhelming vote of support in the western altiplano departments. While Evo hopes to use his renewed mandate to secure his constitutional reforms, the autonomy seekers are most likely going to dig their heels in even further. Absent an unexpected power shift or collapse, the revocatorio results are probably only going to further polarize and alienate the Bolivian population between the opposing factions, as the campaigns and controversies leading up to the vote already have.

Another well-publicized case of violence took place in the media luna region of Tarija. Protesters (from rightist youth groups) there attempted to take over an airport, preventing Venezuela´s Hugo Chavez and Argentina´s Fernandez de Kirchner from attending a planned energy policy meeting with Morales. Both leaders cancelled their trips because of security concerns. The President of Tarija´s Civic Committee, one of the groups spearheading the autonomy efforts, declared that “protests (aka violence and threats) would continue so that the President never sets foot on Tarijeño soil.” It is ironic that this is coming from the regions who claim to be neglected and ignored by the central government. I might also add that the protestors explained that they wouldn’t permit the meeting to occur because they considered the act to be “just political.” People are so easily inflamed in their “passion for democracy”, violence has become accepted by some as a just response to political maneuvering. As Bolivia´s recent history shows, political violence is especially explosive at pivotal moments, such as national votes. The Police and Armed Forces, however, have guaranteed that Sunday´s vote will proceed securely.

Meanwhile, miners involved in a typical protest bloqueo of a major road had a violent confrontation with police. Two died, and several were wounded. Headlines declared that a shadow was cast over the Morales government on Independence Day. More roadblocks, strikes, and protests are likely in the coming days, but whether they will escalate into violence remains to be seen.

In other news, Prefects and Civic Committee officials from several media luna departments are on a hunger strike. They are protesting the revocatorio, and also demanding the return of the IDH (Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons) revenues that are funding the new national pension (discussed in the last post). It strikes me as ironic that some of the most affluent people in Bolivia are going hungry by choice to demand the return of funds that are being used to help keep the poorest and oldest Bolivians from going hungry in poverty.

August on Fire

The vote date of August 10 marches closer, with no sign of peaceful resolution or lowering tensions before or after. Political propaganda and advertisements are ubiquitous. Television commercials show ballot boxes being checked “Yes” or “No” for the President and prefects, with sound bites and images supporting the respective choices. Political graffiti is everywhere, to the same effect.

Neither side is willing to compromise. The autonomy advocates, should they remain in office, will claim the people´s support and the principle of democracy in pushing for more independence and resource control. They have economic strength, well-connected information engines, and resource richness on their side. Also, the autonomy departments have the (mostly covert) support of the United States. Along with anti-narcotics funding, the largest amount of US diplomatic aid goes to “regional development,” which translates into funding for the prefects and civic committees of the media luna. The US, with its pro-neoliberalism diplomacy and protection of multinational interests, is a strong ally for the Bolivian players who seek economic privatization. These factors help explain why these leaders are so confident in their technically illegal, nationally unpopular, and ethically questionable push for separation from the central government.

Evo, on the other hand, is even less likely to compromise. And from his perspective, why should he? He had the legitimacy of the constitution (whose legitimacy has been tarnished by both sides, it is true) at his back. He has a solid democratic majority that is politically active and mobile. He has control of the national police and the Armed Forces of Bolivia. He has strong allies throughout Latin America (where only US-supported Peru and Colombia lack left-leaning reformist leaders). And most importantly, he has the pride and responsibility of being Latin America´s first indigenous president. He stands for so much in the eyes of his supporters that any compromise is a let down. These people are looking for rectification of centuries of injustice, and that is as strong of a political motivation as exists anywhere.

So, we shall see how this political drama unfolds in the next few days. How much is likely to change with the vote results, as I have gathered from conversations of all type, is completely unclear. One month from now, Bolivian politics may be entirely different. A year from now, the situation might be basically the same. The only certainty is that this country is at a boiling point, and almost everyone is hoping that it does not boil over. I will be back with the results of the vote, and a concluding summary, although the international press will probably take enough interest to at least publish the numbers. I have less than a week remaining in Bolivia, and it is sure to be interesting.

Paraguay, Late July, and the Revocatorio

A Paraguayan Perspective

I have been on vacation from my research for the past two weeks, so this entry consists mostly of cultural commentary and some updates on political developments in Bolivia. I am currently in transit to Peru from Asuncion, Paraguay, where I have been resting up and visiting a friend. Asuncion is the capital city, with a proud post-colonial history and a beautiful location along the Rio Paraguay.

Paraguay is similar to Bolivia in many ways, with a noticeably higher level of development and apparent quality of life. Ironically, Asuncion seemed much more dangerous than any of the Bolivian cities I have been in. Most houses in nice neighbourhoods have private guards because of the very real risk of kidnapping and armed robbery. A house we visited often had been robbed at gunpoint by three men in broad daylight less than a week before I arrived. The police are not trusted, regarded either as too cowardly to stand up to crime or complicit with the perpetrators. Corruption is still very much at large in the low (and high?) levels of government and law enforcement, in Paraguay as well as in Bolivia.

The countryside outside Asuncion looked healthy and often picturesque. On a trip to an ecological preserve, I got a glimpse of untarnished landscape that I imagined all of South America to look like before the constructs of modern civilization. This continent truly is a diverse and beautiful place. With the exception of simple roads, the fields and forests and farmhouses look much as they have for hundreds of years. The grinding poverty visible outside of Bolivian cities and along the highways was not to be seen in Paraguay, which may have as much to do with better farmland as with less agrarian oppression than in Bolivia.

One of the biggest differences between Paraguay and Bolivia is the colonial legacy in each country. Paraguay was the only Spanish colony where intermarrying with Native Americans was mandatory, and as a result the population is almost entirely mestizo, a mix between Spanish and indigenous Guaraní. This is a strong contrast to the culturally and geographically close Argentinean population, which is almost entirely of European descent, and is resented by Paraguayans for its arrogant attitude towards other South American countries.

Paraguayans consider themselves to be ethnically and culturally mixed, and while social and economic stratification is still clear, and poverty is still a problem, their political conflicts and issues lack that most polarizing element: race. Bolivia remains remarkably separated ethnically. There are 36 identifiable ethnic groups in the country, the most in Latin America, from the Aymara and Quechua of the altiplano to the diverse tribal groups of the Amazon basin and eastern lowlands.

The lack of racial integration has helped protect the heritage and culture of these indigenous groups, but it has also deepened social and political separations along pre-existing racial (and corresponding geographic) lines. This longstanding pattern of separation, especially between indigenous groups and whites and mestizos, is responsible for much (some would say most) of the antagonism and public hostility that accompanies Bolivian politics today.

The Paraguayan perspective on Bolivian society and politics was interesting, coming from a close neighbour with many social and economic similarities. Even upper class Paraguayans, who generally oppose his politics, considered Evo´s election a sign of hope for a country where indigenous oppression has been harsh and visible, and whose modern society is viewed as both racist and classist. A common view is that opposition to Evo is mainly the result of whites and mestizos who cannot stand to see an Indian ruling the country. This portrayal of the essence of the political conflict is common, and undoubtedly truthful to some extent, but as I have argued before I do not think that racism alone can explain Bolivia´s social problems. Race is certainly a powerful force for manipulation and propaganda, but the interests and motives behind racist rhetoric and action are more complex.

Revocatorio Anticipation: Political Temperature Rising in Bolivia

Back on the subject of Bolivian politics, the situation is as dynamic as ever. An opposition Senator submitted an objection to the legality of the law that enacted the Revocatorio back in May to the only remaining member of the Constitutional Tribunal in Sucre. The other 4 members of Bolivia´s highest court, appointed by the former right-wing president, had all resigned in protest over political interference (or after interfering unconstitutionally in the internal processes of the constitutional assembly), and the divided Legislature has not been able to agree on new judges. Despite the fact that a Tribunal decision must be reached by at least 3 members, the lone judge called for the Referendum to be postponed until the full tribunal could convene to review the vote´s constitutionality.

As expected, opposition Senators and the lone prefect who still refuses to participate in the Revocatorio (Cochabamba´s Manfred Reyes Villa, who actually originally proposed the idea more than a year ago, but who would likely be voted out of office on August 10) exalted the Judge´s decision and called for the government to obey. The Government called the Judge a traitor to democracy and ignored the request, while the National Electoral Court insisted that the constitutionally legislated vote must go ahead as planned unless it is refuted by Congress or a fully convened court.

It is unlikely that the vote is going to be stopped, though there is some speculation that the big date of August 10 will be just another Sunday. Either way, the build-up to the Revocatorio is in high gear. “Tensions are building in Bolivia”, as one international news headline declared. Evo´s ministers are accusing the oligarchic media of a concerted campaign to undermine the Revocatorio and cast doubt on the Presidency. They are also concerned about violence leading up to the vote, specifically from militant right-wing youth groups such as Santa Cruz´s Union Juvenil Cruceñista, which has been accused of Fascist affiliations and has been the instigator of racist violence several times in the past year.

The coalition of opposition prefects, meanwhile, announced plans to start protesting the day after the Revocatorio for a national referendum on the capital issue. They have learned, from the upheaval that they helped create in Sucre back in November, that the capitalía issue is a symbolic and passionate one for many Bolivians. It was instrumental in helping the opposition expand its popular support from the media luna into the Chuquisaca province during the past year.

As I mentioned in an earlier blog, the current constitution only allows for one national referendum a year, and this year´s recall referendum means that next year is the earliest possible vote on the new constitution. If the opposition prefects can push the capitalía issue effectively, they may be able to stall the constitutional referendum for another year, working in the meantime to fortify their autonomy statutes and weaken Evo.

On the economic front, the opposition is denouncing the central government’s renta dignidad, the first ever national pension plan. It covers all citizens over 60, and according to independent economic analysts has lowered the poverty levels by a full 2%. The catch: it is funded by the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH), which the media luna prefects denounce as government interference in their economic affairs. The funny thing is that, by the numbers, IDH revenues to the media luna states have increased steadily every year since Evo took office.

Gas producer Tarija, with 4% of Bolivia´s population, gets a full one third of all IDH revenues. Along with Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando, departmental revenues have increased between 100 and 200% between 2005, just before hydrocarbon nationalization began, and 2008.

Once again, these hard statistics came from an independent economist blog. The contrast with press coverage is startling. Economic headlines in Bolivian newspapers almost always deal only in statements and claims from politicians, mostly from the opposition. There is rarely any investigative journalism that produces facts rather than opinions, and of the few “investigations”, several turned up stories that turned out to be partially fabricated or entirely untrue.

Information is not easy to come by in Bolivia. Within the country, news sources are saturated with bias, and the lines between opinions and analysis are blurry at best. In the international news world, analysis is clouded by one-sided interviews (with US ambassadors, misinformed NGO executives, etc) and the aforementioned lack of solid information coming out of Bolivia.

With that in mind, I will try to keep my blog updated with developments as they happen. There remains less than 2 weeks until the Recall Referendum, and the intensity and unpredictability of the political scene is only likely to increase until August 10. I will be back in La Paz several days before the vote, and I can only hope for excitement and not violence. From Bolivia, signing off.

Santa Cruz, Perspectives, and Passing the Halfway Point

The character of Santa Cruz de la Sierra

Santa Cruz is a different version of Bolivia than the one I had gotten to know in La Paz and, to a lesser extent, in Sucre. The largest city in the country is the capital of its largest department, which shares the same name. I had not known what to expect from the city upon my arrival. In many ways, it is a world away from La Paz and the mountainous West of Bolivia. The climate is tropical, even in winter, with muggy air and a hot sun to go along with the Amazonian vegetation.

Cultural and social differences were visible as well, in both the people and the city of Santa Cruz. Free of high rises and located on a plain, the city stretches for miles of concentric circles that reveal a gradually decreasing level of wealth as you move farther from the central plaza area. The streets and buildings are recognizably Bolivian, but adapted to the city’s climate and economic functioning. Traffic is less frantic, there are many more (and more expensive) private vehicles in the streets, and there are far less people out and on the move.

Santa Cruz gave me the impression of a somewhat diluted Bolivia; a mix between the dynamism and color I have gotten to know and a higher level of commercialization. There are far fewer street vendors or markets, and consumer goods and foods come from stores and supermarkets instead. Shopping seems to be a pastime around the center of the city, and western dress is the norm. In complexion and style, the Cruceño population reflects its location at the junction of the three very different countries: Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina.


Political Opinions: Expectations and Differences

As for politics, Cruceño pride is visibly omnipresent. I saw one national flag my entire time in the city, while the green and white flag of the department flew from every government building and from many stores, homes, and offices. Banners hung in the central plaza, declaring: “We have our autonomy,” “we will always be free Cruceños,” and “We will continue making history.” May 4th, the date of the technically illegal and democratically open autonomy referendum, has already been converted into a symbolic day of political pride. One interviewee offered a frank opinion of political identity: “There is too much division right now for there to be a national identity. Instead, it is the regional identities that are rising, where everyone realizes they have to look out for their own interests.”

The prefect’s department, the civic committee, and the “Comite pro-Santa Cruz,” have focused all of their political efforts on consolidating support around the issue of autonomy, and on the statutes that were voted on. I got the impression that a solid majority of city-dwellers are indeed in favor of autonomy, but the propaganda efforts of the city and regional governments are clearly intended to give the impression of unified and universal support within the department. The main newspaper, el Deber, is a private institution that is closely affiliated with big business, and its strong pro-autonomy and anti-government slant reflects a high level of responsiveness to Santa Cruz’s economic elite.

Impressions from conversations were much less homogenous than the image of Santa Cruz presented by its political power-holders. To begin with, the city of the Santa Cruz and the department of Santa Cruz are distinct and different in several senses. Ethnic composition is different in the more indigenous rural provinces, lifestyle is more agricultural and less commercial, and politics reflect the predominance of lower social-economic classes outside the city. One analyst described the contrast by saying that opposition support ends at the city limits. (the banner reads: "we are autonomous. Cruceño power! Lets continue making history.")

An increasingly important theme in my research is that generalizations tend to be misleading and reflect bias, but there does seem to be a very real division within Santa Cruz department. Several poorer Cruceños agreed that people in the countryside don’t support prefect Costas, and that he only represents the business interests and the rich. One old man said that Costas had not done a single thing to improve the lives of those outside the city during his term; public projects such as schools, infastructure, and education had all been limited to the cities.

Costas and the autonomy advocates would counter by saying that the campaign for the autonomy vote and statutes, which has occupied the prefect’s term, represents the interests of all Cruceños and is the most important step for bettering their lives. Autonomy is consistently tied to themes of social justice, economic equality, local democracy, and increased wealth for all. A politically active former engineer I interviewed argued the party line nicely: “Those in Santa Cruz who support Evo’s government just don’t realize that autonomy is a union to serve all.” Some of these Evo supporters I spoke to felt differently. One young farmer who could barely read but was diligently studying a crossword puzzle in the plaza described his apathy for the local government, and his support for a central government that allows social and economic freedom to all classes and ethnicities, in a country where indigenous campesinos were not allowed in public squares or offices in the fairly recent past.


Considering the government, in perspective

Criticism of Evo was much as expected. “He doesn’t govern with a sense of country.” “He favors certain groups.” “He neglects areas that don’t support him.” Evo would certainly agree that he does not represent all Bolivians, and that he purposefully ostracizes certain sectors. His long term goal is (to use the phrasing from my original research proposal) ‘to alter that traditional political and economic institutions in favor of Bolivia’s historically oppressed and marginalized indigenous peasant majority.”

Considering the historical context of a conflict or situation is always revealing. Governments in Bolivia have always ruled on the power of the largest minority percentage, and represented that minority group accordingly. The difference now is that Evo’s government represents a majority of the population, with the additional difference being that no part of this majority has ever been one of the groups represented in government before.

With this in mind, it is easy to understand why Evo has no problem being seen to favor indigenous poor over wealthy landholders and businessmen. And there is a good reason Evo does not get personally involved in areas that do not support him: they don’t want him. The racist demonstrations in Sucre that I have described were in response to a visit by the President, and on trips to Santa Cruz he has met similar hostility organized by opposition politicians.


Economic viewpoints, and the vacuum of objectivity

On economic questions, the debate over Evo has gotten more interesting for me. In conversations, I see two very different views of his government. On the subject of jobs, critics say that he has dampened the economic sectors where people need work the most, hurting those he claims to help. On the other hand, when I talk to blue-collar and campesino Bolivians, regardless of region, the overwhelmingly dominant response has been that Evo has created jobs and has bettered the lives of the poor. Inflation and food shortages are blamed on the government or on the neoliberal opposition, depending on who you ask.

The topic of nationalization and government management remains interesting. Businessmen in Santa Cruz argue consistently that control of the hydrocarbon industry should be returned to international companies, and that the government is mismanaging gas revenues that are robbed from producing deparments in the first place. A blog on Latin American economics presented a very different picture. A graph of government reserves shows the central bank of Bolivia with monthly increasing amounts of international currencies, totally over 7 billion currently, that are the direct result of the hydrocarbon tax and partial nationalization of the industry.

Consider that the Bolivian state bordered on bankruptcy throughout the neoliberal 80s and 90s, when multinational companies backed by the IMF and World Bank had control of hydrocarbons and infastructure. It is clear where all of this money, which is now in the hands of the once-poor central government, used to go. Tension with multinational corporations and the Bolivian economic elite is understandable, considering this monumental shift of resources. Perhaps just as remarkable is that the Morales government consistently operates on a budget surplus, where spending for 2008 is financed without even dipping into incomes from the same year. So, despite openly socialist programs and policies, the government seems to be fiscally responsible.

The weight of these facts, and the fact that they came not from the Bolivian newspapers I have been reading for weeks but from independent bloggers, again reminds me of the importance of sifting through information to find accurate truths. Many an anti-globalization blog rants against the leverage that thinktanks, NGOs, and development agencies use on behalf of multinational interests, and Bolivia is a favorite example. There are many accusations that the US and other organizations are covertly funding the opposition and doing everything they can to sow seeds of division within Bolivia, knowing that economic opportunity often fills rifts in politics. Whatever the relative importance of these international influences, however, the difficult reality is that there are strong and pervasive influences from economic and private interests throughout Bolivian politics and press. But as I have warned before, generalization is misleading no matter which side it comes from.


The dangers of generalization

For this reason, I have to address a troubling pattern I have seen in other blogs on Bolivia. Many observers, frustrated at opposition tactics and sympathetic with the cause of the downtrodden poor, seem to forget that maintaining a critical perspective is essential to any worthwhile analysis. This means that agreeing with Evo’s position should not mean ignoring the government’s shortcomings and mistakes. Equally importantly, it means that caricaturing the opposition is only going to detract from the goal of promoting understanding of the situation.

Rants against the ‘racist’ and ‘fascist’ opposition does not do justice to the diversity within the various regional and opposition movements, and it also does not recognize that there are good people with sincere concerns who fall under the opposition umbrella. Racism is most often used to characterize the positions of Santa Cruz and the other autonomy states, but it should more accurately be called regionalism. Race is a factor, and the colonial legacy of social separation along racial lines remains a painful and powerful one in Bolivia. But equally or more important are the economic interests in question and the desire for government to be less distant and less bureaucratic.

Another interesting angle on Bolivian politics is the similarity of themes and issues to those of the US. Several of my diligent readers have commented on this to me, and it is true that the same social and economic ills, as well as political limits and potentials, that underlie American society are just more acutely visible here. Political rhetoric is another striking parallel. MAS and Evo talk about a democratic revolution, about change for all of Bolivia, about a better future. Autonomy advocates also claim to represent change, a “new system, new scheme” for a better government and better lives. I have to ask, though, how credible this second claim for change and newness is, considering that autonomy advocates are calling for a change to the system even as they represent the interests and players that built the system. Is this just a rhetorical ploy, a response to the threat of concrete change by casting the old as the new? It reminds me of the Presidential campaign, where Obama’s groundbreaking “change we can believe in” rhetoric has brought a shift in the Republican camp, to where McCain now claims to represent the change that people want to see in Washington. Politics is politics, wherever you go, and in whatever language they are conducted in.

The referendum of August 10 continues to move closer, with neither side showing signs of compromise before then, or after. It is still unclear how prefects will be removed from office, should they lose, including the prefect of Cochabamba, who remains the only departmental leader who refuses to submit to the vote. Most predictions have Evo winning comfortably, and it remains to be seen what impact this will have on the power of the autonomy movements and the prospects for ratification of the new constitution. Again and again, Bolivians agree that the only exit from the current political stalemate/crisis is through dialogue, but it is hard to foresee that happening soon. As one Cruceño put it, Bolivians do politics the Latin way, with less reason than passion. Until they start thinking with their heads and not their stomachs, things are only going to get worse.

I am currently on hiatus from Bolivia, having departed Santa Cruz for Asuncion, Paraguay, where I am staying with the family of a friend. I have already heard some interesting perspectives on Bolivia, considering their source in a neighbor country, and will likely have some other observations to offer soon. For now, the only thing to do is watch the news for any big changes from Bolivia, that country where anything can happen, and usually does.

In the Symbolic Heart of Bolivia

After two eye-opening weeks in La Paz, I moved on to the city of Sucre for my third week. Sucre is the constitutional capital of the republic of Bolivia, was the source of the first liberation movement in South America, and remains the symbolic heart of the country. The contrast with La Paz is dramatic. Where La Paz is intense in every way, bustling and sprawling and crowded, Sucre has an energy that is lively but easygoing. Known as “la ciudad Blanca,” Sucre’s buildings are mostly whitewashed colonial holdovers, and the architecture is beautiful. The streets are less crowded, the plazas are greener, and in general the city has a kind of small-town pleasantness to it.

My visit to Sucre happens to have fallen during winter vacation, so the University life that usually dominates the city is somewhat muted. Still, people are friendly and I have had a lot of quality conversations with people around the centro. In the course of discussing my project here, acquaintances have made some interesting observations. One old man, surprised that I was travelling and staying alone, asked if I was afraid. I said no, and he replied, “Ohhh, macho.” I laughed, it was such a Latin American response.

Another younger man, commenting on the distribution of opinions I was likely to receive here in Sucre, asked if I had been to the campo (countryside). When I said that I had not, he smiled knowingly and said that I would get a very different set of political views from the campesinos that make up Bolivia’s majority.


Regional demographics and political dispositions

I have realized that, with La Paz´s indigenous demographic mitigating the bias somewhat, I am limited in the types of groups I am engaging because I am spending all my time in cities. Still, through the occasional conversation with a visitor from the country, through responses from perceptive city-dwellers, and from general knowledge of the regional demographics, I can make fairly accurate generalizations about the views of these underrepresented country folk. The indigenous campesinos are where Evo gets his strongest support, with their unwavering faith in the first President who they trust to be looking out for their own interests. As a shoeshine boy explained to me, “There are two Bolivias. One is in the cities, and that is where the tourists and politicians and businesses are. The other is in the campo, and the people in the campo have none of the things that people in the city have. Evo is from the campo, he lived there and he knows what that life is like, so he wants to work to make it better for the people in that Bolivia”. His rhetoric of the “2 Bolivias” would have made John Edwards proud (his campaign theme, if you recall, was the “two Americas”).

Opinions on the political awareness of rural Bolivians continue to be divided, but I have learned some interesting things about the way campesinos conduct their politics. As one man from the mining region of Potosí explained it, these people have only recently become aware of the political power they wield through their vote, as a majority group in Bolivia. For this reason -the levelling of the political playing field- Evo can be satisfied that at least one of his goals has been met. These rural communities have learned to inform and organize themselves effectively, to be effective in their political roles. Each pueblo has a governing council, and community leaders whose job it is to travel to cities, listen to politicians, read the news and report back to the rural areas. In town meetings, people share information and views and decide on political views and actions. So while these groups do act as political blocks, they take their positions through deliberate processes that are not controlled by manipulation or social pressure, as some have suggested to me.

Of course, not all agree that the peasant communities have learned to participate constructively in politics. Recent history certainly shows an inclination for direct action, rather than votes, to make a political statement. Many, from “the old man in the park” to powerful politicians, argue that the risk of general strikes and massive highway blockages, strategies employed often in the months and years leading up to Evo´s election in 2005, do more to harm the country than to effect change in government. One man passionately declared that by cutting transportation and preventing people from being able to work, the campesino blockades harmed the areas of the economy that they should be improving. In addition, a country that is often at risk to be paralyzed economically by protests and blockades is not particularly inviting for international businesses and investors.

This argument has value, but lost force when I heard the man’s suggested alternative: “People should just be disciplined in their work, go on with their lives, and keep hoping that the country will improve economically, politically, and socially.” The man who said this believed that the revocatorio was just distracting people from work, and insisted that social tranquillity would lead to economic equilibrium and would eventually result in better quality of life for those who need it most. Politicians, journalists and citizens who fall on the political right consistently argue that the obvious and proven road to progress is through free trade and open markets.

This confidence is interesting to me, a student who has studied again and again the ongoing academic and professional debate over whether the free trade policies of the so-called “Washington Consensus”, supported by the World Bank and IMF (both of which have left strong impressions, mostly negative, on Latin America), are actually effective at reducing poverty and stabilizing economies. The evidence to date is far from conclusive, as a survey of the literature on political economy or a class on international development will readily reveal. Looking back, specifically, at the conditions of Bolivia’s poor during the past decades of neoliberal economics and institutionalized politics, however, I am sceptical of this stock approach to solving the country’s problems.

In theory, Evo´s aim of encouraging investment but making equal redistribution of wealth his priority is exactly what Bolivia needs (and for that matter, Latin America and the rest of the devloping world). The sad truth is that the government´s policies and practices have not met expectations, and controversy over lack of transparency and mismanagement has dogged the administration. Disagreements over the acquisition and re-distribution of the hydrocarbon tax, a point of conflict between producing regions and the central government, is one of the issues that consistently dominates news headlines. Imperfect though their economic knowledge may be, Bolivians are nonetheless intensely concerned with the overlap between politics and the economy. In the United States, even the politically aware citizen assumes that the economy, that vast and vague mechanism, is being run by people who know what they are doing. Here in Bolivia, past and ongoing economic and political instability prevent such a convenient assumption.


Sucre, capital pride, and political views

As I had anticipated from my background reading and conversations, the political insult done to Sucre when the constituent assembly denied its claim for a vote on sole capital status still dominates political views. Critics are technically correct in calling the move “anti-democratic.” Many have declared that they cannot support a constitution that does not make Sucre the administrative capital, and when I press them for a reason most only respond with vague allusions to liberation and independence. One man did point out that such a move would boost the region economically, but in a city that already has a relatively high quality of life, this argument is not overly compelling. Banners, logos, and other propaganda proclaiming the merit of Sucre´s case for being made sole capital of the republic are omnipresent. The newly elected Prefect ran her campaign on the promise of 2 referendums: a vote on departmental autonomy in Chuquisaca and a nationwide vote on the republic´s capital.

The capital pride of the sureños (Sucre residents) saturates political attitudes. The constitution does, in fact, name Sucre as the seat of government, but as the department’s Senator informed me, this issue is as symbolic and antiquated as the loss of Bolivia’s Pacific coastline to Chile (reclaiming the “litoral” is a constant theme of Bolivian political pride). Senator Rodriguez, the department’s representative in the upper house of Congress and a member of the opposition party PODEMOS, had much to say about the Morales Administration and the politics and life of Bolivia in general. Most of it was expected, but some was a surprise. He admitted that the autonomy strategists of the media luna used the symbolic issue of the capitalía to mobilize the people of Sucre against the constitution, not because they supported Sucre’s claim but because any opposition to the government’s constitution meant more leverage for the autonomy movement.

Sucre´s image as a a center of inclusive culture and progressive was tarnished by a startling event in May. In response to a visit by President Morales, local political and social leaders (it is still debated whose fault it was) egged groups of rightist students on to violence against indigenous campesinos in the main square. Farmers were beaten, had their shirts stripped off, and were forced to kneel and repeat chants against Evo. The event took place in the main square, the same square where independence was first declared in South America, and where during my visits families and young people of all races mixed in the pleasant afternoons and evenings. News cameras and a recently released documentary captured the event, and it has been decried as sybolic of the politically-motivated racism that has raised its ugly head in Sucre and Santa Cruz. The streets of Sucre gave no sign that anything other than peaceful coexistance and interaction ever occured, but this racist episode and others like demonstrate not only the darker underside of this post-colonial society, but also the ready potential for violece.


A conversation with the Opposition

Senator Rodriguez made well-articulated arguments against the Morales government’s policies and practices. He described the need for decentralization, offering muted support for the autonomy movements, and criticized the “self-interested” motives of the government in trying to centralize power. He attacked Morales´ government as divisive, combative, and polarizing, doing more to ostracize political and social gropus than to affect change for the Bolivian people. As every Bolivian has, he sympathized with the plight of the poverty-stricken campesino and emphasized the need to increase economic equality and social justice, but he did not think that Evo´s government was keeping its campaign promise to that effect. Health and Education are the two pillars of progress, and each side claims them as the motivation for their positions. Evo´s supporters see a government that is seeking health care and education for everyone, particularly in rural areas where basic necessities are lacking, and where the government´s spending has never reached. Those favoring autonomy and decentralization, on the other hand, blame the La Paz beauracracy for stifling regional efforts to improve facilities within departments.

Rodrigues roundly criticized the economic policies of the Morales Administration as the cause of limited investment, a worsening the job market, and increasing inflation, arguing that opening up the Bolivian economy to foreign companies is the only sure way to lift the informal sector out of poverty and realize stable progress. His example was Peru, which is enjoying record economic growth thanks to the rising prices of mineral commodities mined there. The situation is not all roses, I pointed out, as workers have recently been protesting the exclusive flow of financial benefits to businesses and investors, leaving working class wages stagnant as inflation increases. The Senator responded that this is part of the risk and the process, but he would rather have economic growth and then figure out redistribution of wealth than debate resource redistribution until the opportunities for growth are gone. His point was well taken, but not unconditionally. Again, I look at the unpleasant history of neoliberal policies in Bolivia, where many still vote based on their opposition to the age of “economic imperialism.”

Bearing the banner of the opposition party, the Senator salted his responses to my questions with descriptions of the Morales government as totalitarian and communist and vague references to narco-trafficking and terrorism. He often seemed to catch himself getting carried away on rants against Evo, but in general offered well-reasoned opinions and criticisms. I was surprised to learn later that Rodriguez is one of the local politicians accused of inciting the racist violence in Sucre. When he commented on the event, he iterated the opposition version of the story, where government-supporting MAS members staged the scene to hurt the image of the opposition. Once again, I am reminded that there is no such thing as universally accepted truth in Bolivia. There are two or more sides to every story, various lenses for interpreting every event, and even different press versions of the same topic. I am learning to question everything I hear, read, or see, no matter how convincingly objective it might seem.

Rodriguez was not even on the extreme of the opposition. He called Evo his friend, and recalled hosting him in his home, but went on to declare that the President could hardly read and write. He acknowledged the need for comprehensive government-led reform and a strong central power, even as he stated unequivocably the need for decentralized administration. He described hopes that Evo would be the Mandela of South America, but said that he is just as close to becoming a Mugabe-style dictator. Corresponding views are apparent in the press, depending on whether you are reading La Paz or Santa Cruz newspapers. In a society where politics is everything, polarization is the norm.

He described his party´s support for the revocatorio as a politically calculated decision to avoid a greater evil. Like much else in current Bolivian politics, the referendum law is the result of political posturing and personal pride, and of the heightened tension that allows for no compromise from either side. The needs of the people and the country had little to do with the referendum´s implementation, according to Rodriguez and others I have spoken to. He also re-iterated the common concern that tensions are going to increase up to the vote and beyond. The Senator was thoughtful and complete in his responses, but I certainly got the impression of an old-school politician who knows his stuff but doesn´t seem to be representing anyone or anything specifically.


Prediction: Unpredictability

Bolivia, the Senator informed me, has a political history much like a pendulum, where extremes are approached but not reached, and where the balance returns to the center between swings to the right and left. Bolivia also has made a habit of approaching the boiling point of a crisis, and pulling back just in time to avoid the worst. He expressed hope that this pattern would continue with regard to the current crisis, but also expressed worry that it would not. He informed me that a well-known political analyst had told him that he thought that this might be the first time in over a century that Bolivia could not solve its problems through non-violent politics, and that the potential for full civil war within the next year is very real. This analysis supports a statement made by a UNC professor and Latin America specialist, who also predicted open violence or civil war within this year.

The historical contextualization of this crisis reminded me of the thesis of my original research proposal, where I argued that Bolivia’s current situation, which embodies so many of the racial, social, economic and political conflicts that have dominated Latin American history, is the definitive test case for democracy and modern society in the entire region. Also apparent is the research theme that political and social polarization are the dominant trends in young democracies, where instutions do more to re-inforce painful historical legacies of division than to overcome them. My time here as only more thoroughly convinced me that the raw struggles and conflicts of interests that define Bolivian politics are the determining factor not only in the future of this country but that of the region in general. I will go as far as to say that the ideologies and interests at play in Bolivia today reflect much of the conflicts and issues that drive political and social developments worldwide.

Developments here continue to move rapidly, as does my time in Bolivia. I have moved on now to the Bolivia´s largest city and its economic center, Santa Cruz. I have learned not to expect anything expected, so I will be interested to see what new revelations occur during my days here. There is some bad news on my project front: I recently lost not only my backup digital camera, but also the memory card which contained all of my pictures from Sucre. So, unless by the grace of God it is somehow returned to me, the visual documentation of this recent part of my journey is lost and I will need to buy a new flash card to continue my photography.

Lessons Learned in La Paz

After two entries dealing with my personal experiences with and descriptions of things here in La Paz, it is time for an update on my study of politics. The theme of this post is polarization: in education, in the press, in geography, in politics, and in society. Things are never as simple as I think at first, and every issue and position is layered. As I noted earlier, the issues that have dominated current politics are constitutional reform, autonomy, and the recall referendum. These themes continue to drive political developments here, and now I will elaborate on some of what I have learned in my two weeks here. This is a LONG one, but it covers a lot and will be the only one for a while, so feel free to take it a section at a time, or all in one gulp if you think yourself up to the intellectual challenge.

1. Societal Polarization
2. Evo and the Economy
3. Cycles of Political Antagonism
4. Perception of “Autonomy”
5. Recall Referendum and Prospects for Change


1. Social Polarization

“Bolivia is a young democracy,” it has been explained to me again and again. Perhaps the single root cause of the current political crisis is that Bolivia is dealing with the formative stages of democratic politics, state structure, national economics, and social welfare all at once. Democracy, neoliberalism, social reform, and nationalism were all introduced to Bolivian politics within a decade, and in a country that has no democratic precedents to look back upon, every event is a potential turning point in history. Politics here are not a legacy, nor are they a refined game, as in the U.S. and Europe. Politics here are raw and essential, because political outcomes directly impact the immediate future of individuals, regions, and groups within the country. These are the politics of formation, and very different political visions competing for Bolivia’s future have pushed polarization into all aspects of society.

A paceño friend of mine was giving me the rundown of higher education here in La Paz, in response to my question about the differences between the public and private universities. The public university, located right downtown and featuring a mural of Ché on the wall, is full of izquierdistas. He informed me that public school students are all socialist, communist, or at least anti-imperialist. The more expensive catholic school attended by my friend, by contrast, is located in the affluent suburb of Zona Sur, and is full of derechista students who are all pro-capitalism, pro-free markets, and pro-America. Schools, it seems, are the first place where Bolivians are divided along strict social and economic lines and indoctrinated with an economic and political ideology. This generalization neglects minorities in both camps, of course, but does help to explain how the society-wide divisions that trouble Bolivia today are founded.

The press is the next great example of this societal-political polarization. During an interview with a former journalist and vice-presidential candidate, the media’s role in Bolivia’s crisis became even more clear than it had been just from watching television and perusing the newsstands. She explained to me her theory for media-politics dynamics in Bolivia, where control of the mediums of information was the first battle between the government and the opposition. In a feedback cycle of sorts, competing forces attempt to influence press coverage of politics, resulting in mediums that cater to political viewpoints, which reinforce those viewpoints to the readers who already hold them. The media, divided between pro-government public outlets and opposition-supporting private companies, has worsened the political polarization within Bolivia.

This pattern, as I acknowledged during the interview, is consistent with the psychological phenomenon known as the polarization effect, which explains how people choose to expose themselves to other people and ideas that are consistent with already-held beliefs. The development of “militant journalism,” as my interviewee called it, has severely damaged the credibility of information presented by news mediums. 10 years ago, a study found the public faith in televised information to be unwavering, placing the credibility of the news mediums close to that of the Catholic Church, Armed Forces, and National Police. A recent study, she informed me, found public acceptance of televised information at less than 50%, placing journalism in 11th place in the Bolivian’s list of credible information sources.

This lack of available objective information further hampers political and social progress by encouraging citizens to fill the resulting gaps in information with ideology. Without complete or consistent information, however, political opinions tend to take the simplest forms possible, rendering complex and layered issues into black-and-white, us-vs.-them conflicts. While most of the politically knowledgeable Bolivians I have spoken to agree that sensationalism and concentrated control make the press a polarizing agent in political culture, another journalist I spoke to argued that Bolivians are capable of analyzing information and making deductive judgements. As in every other area of Bolivian reality, however, the truth is that is depends on the region. Big cities and economic centers are bastions of political culture, and so citizens of La Paz and Santa Cruz are saturated in news and information. Rural Bolivians, however, often are exposed only to the most basic news and political information, and are much more likely to make political judgements and decisions in community blocks, as advised by social and communal leaders.

All my interviewees, including those who have run campaigns or written columns against Evo, admit that his level of support deserves respect and democratic legitimacy. While acknowledging his majority victory in the elections, and continuing strong base of support, they also argue that much of Evo´s support comes from disadvantaged social groups who are susceptible to social pressures. As one put it, “most of Evo´s support comes from La Paz-el Alto and rural areas, and he represents the leftist current.” While it is true that most of Evo´s support is from poor and indigenous groups, and many of Evo´s policies are considered socialist, it is hardly true that his support comes from leftists. The truth is, Evo´s supporters are largely groups that have no political experience and have never been represented. The poor majority in Bolivia is not interested in adhering to a socialist ideology; they are supporting a government that they see making changes for their benefit.


2. Evo and the Economy

By far, most of the criticism of Evo I have heard has been concerning his economic record. Economic columnists and NGO spokespeople alike have spoken of poor administration, resource mismanagement, and politically-motivated economic decisions. Issue number one in economics is the nationalization of the hydrocarbon (and maybe soon the mining) industry. It was explained to me that it is not technically “nationalization”, because foreign companies are allowed to invest as long as the government maintains 51% control. Nonetheless, his policies are criticized for dampening foreign investment, slowing the economy, and not taking advantage of the international markets available to Bolivia’s copious resource wealth.

Nationalization was a central platform point of Evo´s election campaign, and I have been told that it was politically motivated and not well thought-out economically. Bolivia recently admitted it could provide only ¼ of the natural gas that it had promised daily in a contract with Argentina. The economic ministers have been criticized as political appointees who lack the technocratic expertise to manage a nationalized energy industry. Evo´s governing style consists more of rural tours and public discussions than of expert-advised policy-making, and has led some to disillusionment. A young man I spoke with said that he had supported Evo´s election with high hopes and expectations, but he has been disappointed by administrative mistakes and lack of political results.

Many Bolivians, however, do see progress from Evo´s policies. In the midst of his referendum campaign, advertisements for the various ministries are highlighting progress and accomplishments in areas from health and education to transportation and energy infrastructure. “Change moves slowly, it doesn’t happen overnight.” This is the attitude of optimistic supporters, who point out that Evo has had only 2 ½ years of heavily opposed rule to make his reforms. An 81-year old sitting in a park declared that I should come back after Evo had been in office for 10 years, and I would see all the changes that he had promised and that his supporters had hoped for.

Whatever side of the political fence, Bolivians agree that they cannot just sit and wait for positive economic change. What the Bolivian economy needs is work and money for its citizens; the disagreement is over how to get it. Free market advocates I have talked to have pointed to the decrease in foreign investment and extraction and argued that open markets are the quickest way to lift Bolivians out of poverty. Evo and his supporters, some of whom recently forced out American development agency USAID, look back on decades of multinational exploitation that did little to improve Bolivian lives. They call on national pride, regional exchange, and state investment to put people to work and keep the money from Bolivia’s resource wealth in the hands of Bolivians. The most workable solution is certainly a compromise, where Bolivia is committed to social progress but still manages to “take advantage of the best aspects of globalization and capitalism.”


3. Cycles of Political Antagonism

Evo is often described in the international news as “Bolivia´s controversial indigenous/socialist/reformist president.” Here in Bolivia, he is controversial on several levels. As I have written, his rejection of neo-liberal precedents and his mixed-socialist economic policies are controversial. Evo´s aggressive political rhetoric and often-divisive positions do little to mitigate political antagonism. In fact, Evo´s language often seems specifically intended to ostracize and demonize his political opponents. The lack of political subtlety in the Presidents statements may reflect his true feelings and the sentiments of his base of support, but have done him more harm than good in the eyes of many politically neutral Bolivians.

Young acquaintances of mine, while they may support some of Evo´s causes, are frustrated by his polarizing nature. “He is the President, he is supposed to represent all Bolivians, but he is not.” One friend compared Evo´s preferential demeanor towards the lower classes as the reverse of previous president “Goni” Sanchez de Lozada´s favor for the upper and middle classes. This criticism, while understandable, does not get much sympathy from me. After all, Evo´s declared mission is to right the wrongs done to the lower classes throughout Bolivia´s history, and the wealthier Bolivians are certainly not in need of reform and social attention in any way like Bolivia´s poor are. Still, when Evo calls every move against him an “imperialist,” “neoliberal” or “secessionist” plot, he deepens Bolivia´s political divides and tarnishes his own credibility.

As I have outlined earlier, the controversy surrounding the constituent assembly and their approval of the new constitution laid the seeds for much of the political antagonism occurring today. One right-of-center interviewee of mine described the government´s action as the “decapitation of constitutionality,” destroying the constitutional legitimacy of that and all future action. Even those in favor of the constitutional reforms will say that the ends may justify the less-than-egalitarian means, but that the episode has contributed greatly to the current crisis. The pro-autonomy department heads, perceiving the constitutional assembly as technically democratic but of debatable legality, took the lesson to heart.

The autonomy votes were the political counterpunch to the controversial constitutional assembly. While certainly illegal under the constitution, the prefects called upon the trump card of democracy, the popular vote. Arguing that their process is no less democratic and no more illegal than the constituent assembly’s vote, the autonomy advocates are further marginalizing constitutional legitimacy. The “magic vote of the citizenship” is today´s token legitimacy, where constitutionality is a luxury and democracy is a relative term that can mean very different things depending on who it benefits.


4. Perception of Autonomy

I expect for opinions on autonomy to get even more interesting in the coming weeks I will spend in Sucre and Santa Cruz. Even thus far, in La Paz, the question of autonomy inspires a diverse array of reactions and understandings. The definition of the word can be interpreted widely. For some, autonomy sounds strikingly similar to secession or independence, and this is how many poor Bolivians have understood it. One old man rambled about foreign infiltration in Santa Cruz after WWII, the gathering of arms in the region, autocratic control of the region`s economy and politics, and the threat of civil war. Each of his opinions about Santa Cruz could be traced back to a news story or to actual circumstances, but his views are a perfect example about how the complex and dynamic nature of Bolivian politics get oversimplified and salted with hostile ideological predispositions.

Santa Cruz often gets vilified by the media, the government, and by public opinion here in the altiplano, as the bastion of privileged elites and selfish citizens. Santa Cruz`s autonomy statutes are the most radical, but a pro-autonomy politician explained to me that the more extreme demands do not necessarily reflect the goals of the department´s people. Many of the demands are made to seem extreme on purpose, to give the prefects leverage in anticipated future negotiations with the government over the reforms represented by the new constitution. This version of autonomy is said to be made “a la mala”, as a negative reaction to the new constitution, justified on the grounds that even an illegal vote is democratic.

Another problem with the autonomy statutes is that they are so visibly and vocally represented by the prefects. Even those who argue that the regional majorities favor autonomy have admitted to me that they view the prefects as representing their own personal interests and those of the economic elite. As they say, the sentiment for autonomy exists in the population, but the politicians are using this democratic cover to protect their own interests as well. While supporters of autonomy look upon this elite representation as a necessary evil, those who oppose (including Evo, the central government, and most Paceños) see it as an unforgivable evil in the autonomy movements.

Most people here in La Paz, in accord with the views of Evo and his ministers, see the autonomy votes as manipulation of many by a selfish and powerful few. As I noted before, the results in favor of autonomy are far from overwhelming in the 4 departamentos that have voted. While this perception of secessionist leadership is pervasive, many also view the people of Santa Cruz as anti-Bolivian (and those of Sucre as racist, remember the graffiti?). When asked how they thought people in different regions self-identify, many have said that Cruceños (Santa Cruz residents) think of themselves as seperate from the rest of Bolivia, and identify first as Cruceños and second as Bolivianos. When asked whether this puts at risk the national democracy, the answer is almost always “yes”.

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the autonomy issue is that noone can agree on what exactly it means. The prefects want more control of regional resources, and a different distribution percentage for tax revenues. The people of the autonomy regions, however, have more immediate and basic motives. Bolivia is a big country, and telecomunications and transportation leave much to be desired in connecting its different regions. La Paz, being the administrative capital, is the seat of all official business, and all federal regulations and certifications must go through the western capital. Frustration has built in eastern regions, where doctors or professors or anyone needing federal certification or approval must go all the way to La Paz.

The autonomy sought by the departamentos could better be described as de-centralization. People in regions distant from La Paz feel neglected and inconvenienced by the central government, and want the bulk of administration brought closer to home and run through municipal and regional governments. This request is not anti-reform: even non-Evo supporters would agree that Bolivia needs a comprehensive and cooperative plan for reform, a “national pact” as I have heard it called. The difficulty lies in the cooperation and mutual understanding necessary to accomplish decentralization and national reform at the same time. As I have seen, those in favor of each process have taken steps toward their end in the most antagonizing manner possible, and the two goals now are so polarized and their advocates so estranged that Bolivia seems to be on what one editorial called “El Camino a la Violencia”, the “road to violence.”


5. Recall Referendum and Prospects for Change

As I originally wrote, the national recall referendum of August 10 will serve as the climax and culmination of my studies here. As I also mentioned, I expected the situation and circumstances of the referendum to change a great deal between the time of my arrival and the vote. I have not been disappointed.

The referendum was originally proposed by Evo and rejected by the opposition, but after the success of the autonomy votes the opposition coalition PODEMOS and the oficialista MAS voted the referendum into law with a bipartisan majority. The recall is constitutionally legitimate, because it was passed as a law by Congress and is organized and administered by the as-yet untarnished National Electoral Court. However, it is without precedent, and the motives for the vote and the potential results have further polarized government supporters and opposition.

A central disagreement is over the percentage necessary to remove an elected official from office. The original law requires a “no” vote greater than the percentage that elected the official to office. This would mean that 54% would have to vote “no” to remove Evo from office, because of the 54% majority he won in the 2005 elections. For the regional governors, who are also subject to the referendum law, the percentages are much lower. Many prefects were elected with between 30-45% support, meaning that a minority “no” vote in the recall equivalent to their previous victory percentage in general elections could remove them from office. This is part of Evo´s strategy: if opposing prefects are removed from office, either new elections will be held or Evo himself will appoint the governors in the traditional constitutional method. The opposition party in Congress is working to change the recall law to require and even 51% “no” vote to remove an official from office, regardless of their incoming election percentages. This change would clearly help the opposition prefects and hurt Evo, so resistance in Congress is not surprising. The future of this effort is unclear, and is one of the big questions that remain concerning the upcoming referendum.

Also uncertain is whether all the departmental prefects will participate in the revocatorio or not. The law applies the recall to every governor as well as the president and vice-president, but the coalition of opposition prefects declared 2 weeks ago that they would not participate. In a recent change, however, 2 opposition prefects, including autonomy leader Costas of Santa Cruz, have agreed to submit to the recall referendum without pre-conditions. Another prefect has said he will participate only if the voting rules are changed to the 51% majority requirement. It remains true that much is likely to change before the date of the vote, in just over a month.

Voter registration for the August recall is the highest ever recorded in Bolivia, even surpassing the record-breaking elections of 2005 and 2006. Participation among those able to vote is expected to reach 80% in some areas, with La Paz-el Alto and the surrounding area drawing the highest proportion of residents to the polls. This level of voter participation, when considered alongside the amount of political demonstration that takes place in Bolivia, is perhaps the most startling difference between democracy here and in the U.S. Democracy here is not an assumption, nor does it inspire complacency or apathy. The gritty and passionate politics of Bolivia reflect the genuine and immediate interest of the people in their own futures and that of their country. There is a real need for change here, recognizable everywhere, and people respond with strong opinions and political action. If the citizens of a country like the United States could find that same urgent conviction, things could get very exciting very fast. On a side note, an old man informed me that Bolivians all support the American candidate who is the first moreno (black man) to be nominated for President.

For now, however, Bolivians face the prospect of continuing struggles. Most educated opinions I have heard guessed that there will be 2 years more of political stalemate, barring an unlikely governmental collapse or the disintegration of the opposition. Some advocate a new constituent assembly, to write a constitution that will incorporate the regional autonomy statutes within a de-centralized. Others think that Evo will be able to force through his reforms and constitution, and that the rebellious prefects will cave to the central government. But all agree that the current crisis is as much the result of personal interests and stubborn attitudes than of irreconcilable differences. Hope has been expressed that the two sides can sit down at the table to work out their differences, but the heightened political tension makes sincere dialogue unlikely from either side. As one interviewee put it, “all Bolivians want to better their lives, they want to move forward, they want more equality and social justice. The people want progress, and they are frustrated by the political blockage.”

Much is likely to change before the revocatorio, and despite generally low expectations, the vote may shift the political balance in Bolivia one way or the other. As each news headline makes me re-think what I know about Bolivia, I am reminded of the saying: “en Bolivia, todo es posible, nada es seguro”. Everything is possible, nothing is certain. Speaking of politics, one NGO worker concluded his interview by saying “aprendas que en Bolivia, puede pasar loe que no has imaginado.” You learn that in Bolivia, things can happen that you haven’t even imagined.

Thus, my project continues to reflect the dynamic and uncertain course of Bolivian politics. I leave behind my 2 weeks in La Paz, and head now to Sucre for almost a week. From Sucre, I travel to Santa Cruz. Each of these cities will certainly provide new insights and developments, and I will return to my blog when I am able. Happy late 4th of July, and que todo vaya bien.